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PERCEPTUAL HARM AND THE CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
Erin Sheley* 
This article defends the controversial existence of criminal liability for 
corporations by showing how, when a corporation commits a crime, it 
imposes additional harms on its victims which flow specifically from the 
nature of the corporate structure itself and therefore cannot be 
vindicated solely through the punishment of individual employees.  
First, I examine the current debate on corporate criminal liability and 
argue that it overlooks the important question of whether there is a 
difference in kind, as opposed to simply degree, which distinguishes 
corporate crime from individual crime and therefore justifies allegedly 
“redundant” punishment.  Second, I use the example of the crime of 
bribery to demonstrate how the nature of the wrong it punishes relates 
to the networks bribery creates to consolidate power—real and 
perceived—over other market participants, and the attendant social 
malaise that results from the corruption of these networks.  Third, I 
marshal psychological, sociological, and narrative evidence suggesting 
that the same perceptual harms caused by corporate acts of bribery are 
frequently at work in less obvious ways whenever a corporation commits 
a crime.  I argue that upon this basis, and under circumstances in which 
a showing of corporate mens rea is possible, that corporate criminal 
liability should be available.  Finally, I argue that, notwithstanding 
these strong arguments for corporate criminal liability, the bribery 
cases also demonstrate how the dramatic and variable role of 
prosecutorial discretion in attaching official blame to corporate harm 
runs the risk of undermining the expressive value of corporate 
punishment through an emphasis on consequentialist outcomes.  These 
outcomes, I argue, improperly aggrandize the prosecutor’s ex post 
remedial role at the expense of redressing the underlying corporate 
harm. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011 Lindsey Manufacturing, a California maker of emergency 
power systems, became the first corporation to be convicted at trial for 
bribery under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).1 The case 
presented a colorful fact pattern: in exchange for business, Lindsey’s 
agent bribed an official at the Mexican Comision de Federal de 
Electricidad with, among other things, a Ferrari and a $1.8 million 
yacht.2 It also presented an important question of statutory 
interpretation: whether an employee of a state-owned utility qualified as 
a “foreign official” for the purposes of liability under the Act.3  Far more 
importantly, however, Lindsey Manufacturing marks the first time in the 
more than thirty years of the FCPA’s existence that a corporation has 
been convicted under it not through a plea agreement with the 
government, but through the societal “ritual by which the faith of the 
community in the administration of criminal justice is maintained.”4   
Described as a “new, ominous milestone” by the Wall Street Journal 
and heralded by the Department of Justice as only the first of more such 
outcomes,5 the Lindsey conviction should cause consternation amongst 
 
 1. See Stuart Pfeifer, Azusa Firm, Two Execs Convicted of Mexican Bribery Scheme, L.A. 
TIMES, May 11, 2011.  Harris Corporation had also taken an FCPA indictment to trial, where the court 
dismissed the action after hearing the prosecution’s case in chief.  Jim Doyle, Judge Tosses Out 
Overseas Bribery Case, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 20, 1991, at B6. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 4. George C. Harris, The Communitarian Function of the Criminal Jury Trial and the Rights of 
the Accused, 74 NEB. L. REV. 804, 807–08 (1995). 
 5. Nathan Koppel, A Criminal First: Company Convicted of Foreign Bribery, WALL ST. J., 
May 11, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/05/11/a-criminal-first-company-convicted-of-foreign-
bribery/ (“‘Lindsey Manufacturing is the first company to be tried and convicted on FCPA violations, 
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FCPA critics and optimism from the statute’s supporters.  It should also 
be welcome by others who have argued that an increasingly pervasive 
recourse to plea agreements, deferred and non-prosecution agreements 
has contributed to an already excessive degree of prosecutorial 
discretion in determining the standards for liability for corporate 
criminal misconduct.6  But the Lindsey case—causing, as it did, the 
evaluation of an act of corporate bribery by the community 
representatives that comprise the criminal jury—also implicates a 
broader set of questions about corporate criminal liability more 
generally. 
Opponents of entity liability argue that innocent shareholders and 
stakeholders should not be punished for the crimes of some employees, 
for whom the law of conspiracy already provides group liability (in the 
Lindsey case, for example, the corporation’s CEO and CFO were also 
convicted along with Lindsey itself).7  Others argue that imposing 
criminal liability on a corporation over-deters misconduct from an 
economic standpoint.8  Those who support the availability of corporate 
criminal liability to punish corporations such as Lindsey point to the 
severity of the harm flowing from corporate misconduct9 and the 
expressive value of punishing corporations in addition to their 
constituents.10  Others draw upon the recent scholarship on the “utility 
of desert” to suggest that, if social norms support criminal liability for 
corporations, we risk delegitimizing the criminal law by failing to 
impose it.11 
For the proponents’ arguments to overcome the objections of 
redundancy and unfairness raised by opponents, it is not enough to 
demonstrate, as many scholars have, that corporations cause a lot of 
harm or even that the condemnation of corporations accurately captures 
societal views about liability in a way that achieves utilitarian goals of 
legitimizing the criminal law.  Due to the public harms the criminal 
 
but it will not be the last,’ said the DOJ’s Lanny Breuer.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: Exploring the 
Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481 (2007). 
 7. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359 (2009); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One 
Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009). 
 8. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Skyes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 
(1996); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1477 (1996). 
 9. See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1437 (2009). 
 10. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
609, 618–19 (1998). 
 11. See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 
521 (2006). 
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justice system is designed to vindicate, the question of whether social 
norms support the notion of corporations as morally and criminally 
responsible is relevant.  But the inquiry does not stop there; no 
utilitarian benefit of criminal punishment can justify imposing it on a 
non-culpable party.  Corporate criminal liability proponents must also 
therefore prove that the harm caused by a corporation qua corporation—
and, therefore, the actus reus component of the wrong sought to be 
criminalized by the justice system—is uniquely attributable to the 
corporation as a collective, beyond the harm that can be attributed to the 
employees that comprise it.  If such additional harm can be shown to 
exist, it is not vindicated solely by punishing individual employees, and 
the corporation’s shareholders should not be able to avoid the financial 
repercussions of this harm being criminally redressed.  The crime of 
bribery, when committed by corporate actors such as Lindsey, with its 
diffuse and complicated effects on society as a whole, provides a useful 
vehicle for exploring the nature of corporate criminal harm. 
This article considers the structure and effects of corporate acts of 
bribery to challenge arguments against the availability of corporate 
criminal liability and to demonstrate that it serves a coherent and 
legitimate penal purpose alongside individual liability due to the dual 
nature of the corporation itself.  On the one hand, because the 
corporation is perceived in the culture as a morally culpable personified 
individual, there are utilitarian benefits to holding it criminally liable 
and thereby avoiding the many pragmatic disadvantages of undermining 
social norms.  Even more importantly, due to the collective qualities of a 
corporation—namely, the geographic, structural, and temporal 
complexities of its operations—corporate criminal misconduct actually 
imposes further harms (which I define as “perceptual harms”) on its 
victims and on society than would derive from the same misconduct if 
perpetrated by a group of unincorporated individuals.  Therefore, 
beyond the utilitarian benefits that come from vindicating social norms 
about corporate culpability, punishing a corporation in addition to its 
constituents is philosophically coherent because of the additional layer 
of harm corporate crime produces.  As I discuss in more detail further 
on, however, the current standard for corporate criminal liability—one 
of straight respondeat superior for all actions of individual employees, 
even when acting against orders—is overly broad.  Because the 
perceptual harms I identify derive from an individual’s orientation to the 
overall corporation, it would be unjust to impose punishment for them in 
cases where the overall corporation cannot be said to have acted with, at 
a minimum, criminal negligence. 
In Part II, I present a short overview of the debate over the existence 
of corporate criminal liability, noting that it largely misses the important 
4
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question of whether there is a difference in kind that distinguishes the 
harm caused by the criminal action of a corporation, rather than simply a 
difference in degree.  I also discuss alternatives to the current standard 
of respondeat superior and argue that the imposition of corporate 
criminal liability should require a showing that, at the institutional level, 
the corporation acted with criminal negligence in its failure to prevent 
the misconduct of its employees.  In Part III, I collect evidence of shared 
social intuitions about corporations as personified moral actors.  I argue 
that the punishment of corporations along with their executives serves 
an important expressive function which in turn legitimizes the criminal 
justice system by tracking with the intuitions about moral 
blameworthiness that support it.  These utilitarian benefits weigh in 
favor of corporate criminal liability, assuming the existence of 
substantive harm attributable to the corporation in fact. 
 In Part IV, I use the example of the crime of bribery to demonstrate 
how much of the substantive harm caused by corporate bribery flows in 
part from the networks bribery creates to consolidate power—real and 
perceived—over consumers and other market participants, and the social 
deterioration resulting from individuals’ sense of helplessness before 
these institutional structures.  These perceptual harms, I argue, arise 
from the nature of the corporate structure itself, with its enduring 
temporal existence and its capacity for broad geographical action.  
Where this harm is joined by the adequate degree of corporate 
culpability it should properly be accounted for through criminal 
punishment. 
In Part V, I show how the same perceptual harms caused by corporate 
acts of bribery are at work in less obvious ways whenever a corporation 
commits a crime.  Collecting psychological and narrative evidence 
suggesting that some of the harm suffered by victims of corporate crime 
arises directly from the corporate nature of the criminal, I will therefore 
propose that we can frequently discern at least some degree of corporate 
harm that is distinguishable from the harm caused by the corporation’s 
individual constituents. 
In Part VI, I argue that the FCPA cases demonstrate how the current 
dramatic and variable role of prosecutorial discretion in attaching 
official blame to corporate harm runs the risk of undermining the 
expressive value of corporate punishment through an emphasis on 
consequentialist outcomes.  These outcomes, I argue, improperly 
aggrandize the prosecutor’s ex post remedial role at the expense of 
redressing the underlying corporate harm, perhaps even increasing it by 
entrenching the structural interdependence between corporations and 
legal authorities.  In Part VII, I conclude. 
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II. CRIMINALIZATION AND ITS CRITICS 
In the controversial 1909 New York Central case, the Supreme Court 
imported the tort doctrine of respondeat superior into the criminal law, 
holding that for the purposes of criminal punishment, both the actions 
and intentionality of individual employees acting within the scope of 
their authority could be attributed to the corporation, even when acting 
“against the express orders of the principal.”12  Later cases elaborated on 
this standard by holding, first, that the employee must act, at least 
partially, for the purposes of benefitting the corporation,13 and second, 
that the employee need have only apparent authority to act on behalf of 
the corporation.14 
Critics of corporate criminal liability have argued that it violates the 
three classic purposes of criminal punishment (retribution, deterrence, 
and rehabilitation) because—while the misconduct in those cases is in 
reality perpetrated by employees of the corporation who can be 
criminally punished as individuals, including under collective liability 
theories such as conspiracy and aiding/abetting liability—the criminal 
punishment is suffered by innocent shareholders and stakeholders.15  
Furthermore, empirical studies have found that corporate criminal 
liability—which by definition can only impose financial penalties in lieu 
of incarceration—is unnecessary to deterrence and, indeed, creates 
overdeterrence problems.16 
Defenders of corporate criminal liability stake their claims on both 
philosophical and pragmatic grounds.  In an influential article in the 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Peter French rebutted the argument 
that corporate actions are in reality only the actions of employees, which 
he described as the notion that “although corporate actions may not be 
 
 12. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–95 (1909). 
 13. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722–24 (5th Cir. 1963). 
 14. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[L]iability may 
attach without proof that the conduct was within the agent’s actual authority.”). 
 15. John Hasnas makes the point that this notion violates retributive principles of justice by 
virtue of this unfair punishment of innocents: “A criminal justice system based exclusively on a 
retributivist theory of punishment would expressly exclude such vicarious criminal liability.”  Hasnas, 
supra note 7, at 1339.  Hasnas also argues that such punishment fails on deterrence grounds as well 
because, “In the Anglo–American Criminal Justice system, deterrence refers to inflicting punishment on 
a wrongdoer to discourage others from committing similar offenses.  It does not refer to punishing the 
innocent to pressure them into suppressing the criminal activity of their fellow citizens.”  Id.  With 
respect to rehabilitation, Hasnas argues that, while corporate criminal liability may “influence managers 
to adopt legal compliance programs and to otherwise try to produce a corporate environment that 
discourages criminal activity by its employees,” such action is nonetheless unacceptable because 
“[t]hreatening innocent shareholders with punishment for the offenses of culpable corporate employees 
may be an effective means of producing a general improvement in ‘corporate culture,’ but it is not a 
form of rehabilitation that can justify criminal punishment in a liberal legal regime.”  Id. at 1340. 
 16. See generally Fischel & Sykes, supra note 8; Khanna, supra note 8. 
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reducible without remainder, corporate intentions are always reducible 
to human intentions.”17  French pointed to the Corporation’s Internal 
Decision Structure (CID Structure), with its constitutive organization 
chart and corporate decision making policies, as evidence of a corporate 
intentionality above and beyond the sum of individual employee 
intentions.18  The CID Structure, French said, “licenses the descriptive 
transformation of events . . . to corporate acts by exposing the corporate 
character of those events,”19 thereby “licens[ing] redescriptions of 
events as corporate events and attributions of corporate intentionality” 
without obscuring “the private acts of executives, directors, etc.”20  This 
conceptualization is consistent with scholarship on organizational 
behavior that finds individual behavior to be altered by membership in a 
collective.21 
It should be noted here that the debate over corporate criminality can 
actually be broken down into two sets of concerns.  The first is whether 
corporations should be criminally liable at all.  The second is whether 
the current liability standard of respondeat superior is appropriate.  One 
might, for example, believe that a company like Fannie Mae (which 
evidence suggests once had a top-to-bottom policy intended to 
encourage employees in each of the corporation’s functions to record 
their accounting decisions with an eye to meeting the president’s 
earnings-per-share target at the expense of truthfulness)22 should be held 
 
 17. Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 212 (1979). 
 18. Id. at 211–12. 
 19. Id. at 212. 
 20. Id. at 214. 
 21. See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 6 (1949) 
(noting that the discipline of group psychology arose from the fact that an individual “thought, felt and 
acted in quite a different way from what would have been expected” due to “his insertion into a 
collection of people which has acquired the characteristic of a ‘psychological group’”); ARLIE RUSSELL 
HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 205–06 
(1997) (discussing strategies of corporate management for drawing employees into firm culture); LARRY 
MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 75 (1992) (analyzing the means by which groups change the values of 
their members to create conformity); EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE 
UNCUT VERSION 240 (1983) (discussing how “criminal behavior is learned in association with those 
who define such behavior favorably and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably”). 
 22. A government investigation into Fannie’s top-to-bottom efforts to meet the president’s 
quarterly earnings-per-share target of 6.46 uncovered a speech given by the head of the company’s 
internal audit function in which he admonished his auditors: 
By now every one of you must have 6.46 branded in your brains.  You must be able to 
say it in your sleep, you must be able to recite it forwards and backwards, you must have 
a raging fire in your belly that burns away all doubts, you must live, breath and dream 
6.46, you must be obsessed on 6.46 . . . After all, thanks to Frank, we all have a lot of 
money riding on it . . . .  We must do this with a fiery determination, not on some days, 
not on most days but day in and day out, give it your best, not 50%, not 75%, not 100%, 
but 150%.  Remember, Frank has given us an opportunity to earn not just our salaries, 
benefits, raises, ESPP, but substantially over and above if we make 6.46.  So it is our 
moral obligation to give well above our 100% and if we do this, we would have made 
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liable as an entity, but nonetheless object to entity liability in a case 
where a rogue employee commits a crime on his own initiative and 
against directives. 
Indeed, several proposals have been made for limitations on the New 
York Central standard to cases in which collective corporate mens rea is 
more apparent.  The Model Penal Code would limit liability to cases in 
which “the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, 
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors 
or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within 
the scope of his office or employment.”23  Other proposals have 
included requiring the prosecution to establish that the corporation has 
not taken all reasonable steps to prevent the misconduct of its 
employees24 and allowing the affirmative defense that the organization 
had in place a compliance program relevant to the alleged crimes.25  In 
reality, as I discuss in Part VI, prosecutorial charging guidelines have, in 
any case, resulted in a more narrowly tailored enforcement standard 
which, while licensing a vast degree of prosecutorial discretion, 
generally turn on some showing of institutional mens rea. 
Because I agree with critics of the current standard that it allows for 
entity liability for individual acts unsanctioned by, and even 
contradictory to, any coherent understanding of corporate intentionality, 
my argument in this article in favor of entity liability is limited to cases 
where the prosecution can prove an institutional mens rea of, at a 
minimum, criminal negligence.  Specifically, I would limit the 
imposition of such liability to cases where the corporation failed to 
perceive a substantial and justifiable risk of misconduct occurring and 
take reasonable measures to prevent it. 
The standard of criminal negligence is particularly appropriate to the 
corporate context because it allows for consideration of what Patrick 
O’Neil calls non-proximate mens rea—that is: 
[O]ne or more points of choice when the perpetrator either chose to 
indulge in the habits of mind which ultimately led to patterns of 
negligence or (more likely) chose not to take steps to correct patterns of 
negligence or patterns of mental inadvertency having the potential to lead 
 
tangible contributions to Frank’s goals. 
OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTERPRISE OVERSIGHT, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION OF FANNIE 
MAE 4 (2006), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/747/FNMSPECIALEXAM.pdf (emphasis 
omitted). 
 23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (2011). 
 24. Andrew Weissmann, A New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1319, 1335 (2007). 
 25. Bucy, supra note 9, at 1442. 
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to acts of negligence.26 
J.W.C. Turner, in a well-known debate with H.L.A. Hart, once posited 
that the basic idea of criminal negligence was incoherent.  The paradox 
he pointed out was that if the law of negligence requires that a negligent 
action be inherently unconscious—a failure to meet a standard rather 
than an act of will—then it cannot constitute mens rea at all because it is 
not intended.27  By contrast, were a seemingly negligent act done with 
some awareness of the consequences, it would rise to the level of 
recklessness, obviating the need for the category of criminal 
negligence.28  This argument is intellectually akin to the claim that a 
corporation cannot unilaterally “intend” its conduct and should therefore 
not be subject to the moral condemnation of the criminal law.  O’Neil’s 
solution to the paradox of criminal negligence demonstrates the 
appropriateness of the standard in the corporate context.  He posits that 
the non-proximate mens rea required for criminal negligence is “an 
immoral intention not close to the negligent act in time or chain of 
causation, but a (relatively) remote part of that chain of causation.”29  He 
provides the example of the drunk driver who cannot be said to 
specifically “intend” his impaired actions upon getting behind the wheel 
of a car, but who did intend to consume the alcohol that got him into that 
state in the first place.  In a corporation, composed of many actors 
engaging in cooperative behavior over extended temporal periods, the 
mens rea of employees or officers who fail to provide the proper 
oversight necessary to prevent foreseeable criminal misconduct properly 
supports a finding of corporate criminal negligence when connected in a 
chain of causation to an eventual actus reus on the part of another 
employee.30 
 
 26. Patrick M. O’Neil, The Moral Blindness of the Positivistic Legal Hermeneutic and the Non-
Proximate Mens Rea in the Law of Criminal Negligence, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 289, 301 (1996). 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. The operative theory of causation underlying this analysis comes from the insights of Ned 
Hall and others who have shown how the two standard theories of causation—causation as production, 
which requires physical demonstration, and causation as dependence (“counterfactual” or “but for 
causation”)—govern two distinct classes of events.  While causation-as-dependence has been seen to 
fail as a theory when applied to actions, due to oft-discussed problems of overdetermination, it 
successfully describes the causal relationship between an omission and its effects. See generally 
CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS (John Collins et al. eds., 2004).  Marcelo Ferrante offers a useful 
example: 
[O]missions are arguably not just absences.  There is something in the world to which 
the statement “Borges omitted to give Verna the antidote at t” refers.  Certainly, the mere 
absence of an action does not amount to an omission.  For instance, it is not the case that 
I’m traveling to Alpha Centauri while I write these lines, and yet we will not say that I’m 
failing or omitting to travel to Alpha Centauri while I write this.  Though it is part of the 
meaning of an omission-statement such as “Borges omitted to give Verna the antidote at 
9
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Consider, for example, a pair of hypothetical examples.  In the first, X 
Corporation, based in Texas, acquires Y Corporation, based in Illinois.  
Y Corporation manufactures widgets and does much of its business 
selling them to the state government.  X Corporation has a compliance 
program to train employees on the rules for bidding on procurement 
contracts, which consists of an annual training seminar at corporate 
headquarters for all officers and printed materials on the ethical rules of 
government contracting which are distributed to all employees.  
Nonetheless, the Illinois widget market is very small and dominated by 
two primary actors: Y Corporation and another small manufacturer.  Y 
Corporation and the other manufacturer had a longstanding bid-rigging 
arrangement, dating from long before the merger with X corporation and 
creation of XY Corporation.  The arrangement has effectively kept other 
widget manufacturers from entering the market, and has resulted in poor 
quality widgets being purchased by the state for use in their construction 
projects.  The arrangement was an open secret and, had XY Corporation 
more closely scrutinized the reality of its new office’s practices, it would 
have been detected. 
In the second scenario, X Corporation also has a formal compliance 
program, as well as very strongly entrenched corporate norms against 
illicit bidding practices.  After acquiring Y Corporation it sends a 
representative to Illinois to become acquainted with that office’s bidding 
procedures and finds them to be above-the-board and in line with X 
Corporation’s practices.  Several months later, one of Y Corporation’s 
contracting officers, acting against the explicit instructions of his 
supervisor and in the hopes of securing a commission for himself, works 
out and conceals a bid-sharing agreement on a pair of widget contracts 
with his counterpart at a rival corporation. 
Under the current law, XY Corporation would be liable in both cases.  
Yet it is clear from the comparison of examples that in the first case, 
despite the existence of a paper compliance program, there were 
multiple opportunities for management and compliance officers within 
the corporation to become aware of the ongoing misconduct in the new 
Illinois office and the corporation nonetheless collectively failed to do 
 
t” that it is not the case that Borges gave Verna the antidote at t, the statement entails 
more than that.  Indeed, the statement asserts a fact about Borges, which is made true by 
a number of concrete things that obtain in the world—like the existence of Borges 
himself and whatever additional facts it takes for us to truly claim that he is able at t to 
give Verna the required antidote (e.g., there being an antidote at Borges’s reach, and so 
on).  So the statement refers to those things, only that it describes them partly in a 
contrastive or negative way, picking out something they are not. 
Causation in Criminal Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 470, 475 (2008).  In a similar vein, when 
we say a corporation “omitted” an action necessary to prevent a crime committed by one of its 
employees we refer to the existence of some institutional capacity to do so—which may or may not exist 
depending on the difficulty of detecting the specific misconduct in question. 
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so.  In the second case, the corporation—both in its central operations 
and at the management level in the Illinois office—took explicit steps to 
prevent misconduct of the sort that transpired.  In neither case can the 
corporation have been said to have unilaterally “acted,” but the standard 
of criminal negligence allows for an inquiry into whether the 
corporation collectively failed to act in such a way at any point 
temporally prior to the actus reus in a chain of causation.  In the second 
example, the question of whether a reasonable corporation acting with 
care would actually have prevented the misconduct might require a 
closer inquiry into the particular facts, but the law should nonetheless be 
able to distinguish it from the first, in which the failure is much clearer.  
The extent to which such a standard may leave factual uncertainty on a 
case-by-case basis only demonstrates the social utility of allowing 
juries—rather than prosecutors, who have institutional incentives 
beyond trying to peg punishment precisely to the degree of actual 
culpability31—to fill in the gaps by determining whether the requisite 
degree of corporate mens rea exists.  
In any case, even if some form of corporate intentionality can in fact 
be demonstrated, it may nonetheless not follow that the non-human 
structures in which it resides should be punished, as many of the 
ramifications of criminal punishment cannot, as Hasnas and others note, 
affect the non-human structure itself, but only innocent third parties.  To 
respond to this challenge, others have noted that, regardless of the 
seeming redundancy in punishing both corporations and their individual 
employees, corporate criminal liability serves yet another expressive 
function of criminal law.  One of the retributive goals of criminal 
punishment is “to assert[] moral truth in the face of its denial.”32  To 
punish a corporation is, therefore, to publicly repudiate the harm done to 
individuals through an illegal act in pursuit of profit.33 
Building upon this insight, and rejecting the notion that deterrence 
 
 31. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2554 (2004) (“Voters’ preferences, courthouse customs, the prosecutor’s 
reputation as a tough or lenient bargainer, her own views about what is a proper sentence for the crime 
in question—all these things play a role in defining the sentences that prosecutors are likely to seek in 
plea bargains.”). 
 32. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, 
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 125 (1998); see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598 (1996) (through imposing criminal liability “society says, in effect, that the 
offender’s assessment of whose interests count is wrong”); Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of 
Corporate Immunity, 64 Hastings L. J. (forthcoming 2013) (arguing that only deterrence and 
expressivism taken together can justify the imposition of corporate criminal liability). 
 33. Kahan, supra note 10, at 618–19 (“Just as crimes by natural persons denigrate 
social values, so do corporate crimes . . . .  Punishing corporations, just like punishing natural 
persons, is also understood to be the right way for society to repudiate the false valuations 
that their crimes express.  Criminal liability “sends the message” that people matter more 
than profits and reaffirms the value of those who were sacrificed to ‘corporate greed.’”). 
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and efficiency are the only interests in play in considering corporate 
criminal liability, Lawrence Friedman argues that “[a]bsent the 
possibility of criminal liability, corporations would escape moral 
condemnation for wrongdoing, and the retributive import of criminal 
liability to the community would be lost.”34  In thinking about the 
expressive function of criminal justice, it is not enough to observe that 
because “corporations cannot be imprisoned” the “essential 
question . . . is whether the criminal law has any useful role to play in 
setting the damages that firms must pay for the wrongful acts of their 
agents.”35  The appropriateness of the criminal justice system as a means 
of imposing fines on organizations is an important and troubling 
question; certainly the bad effects on business and productivity 
threatened by overdeterrence—especially under the current overbroad 
standard of vicarious liability—should be considered in contemplating 
severity of available financial penalties and urge in favor of penalties 
better-keyed to actual harm caused in order to avoid unproductive over-
penalization. 
But concern about innocent shareholders cannot shut down the 
threshold question of whether corporate criminal liability should exist at 
all.  Allowing corporations to be held liable even in tort likewise 
punishes shareholders up to the limits of their investment; yet the law 
permits this because it would be unjust for shareholders to be enriched at 
the expense of third parties who have suffered through the actions of the 
corporation.  And shareholders, of course, can seek to recoup their 
losses through derivative actions against the officers and directors of the 
corporation.  John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have noted in the 
torts context that the role of the judicial function is not merely “the 
delivery of compensation to those in need, or the deterrence of antisocial 
conduct, or the shifting of losses to those who are responsible for the 
loss,” but “to afford the victims of certain wrongs an avenue of recourse 
against those who have wronged them.”36  Likewise, the availability of 
the criminal law as a forum for the state’s condemnation of those who 
violate its precepts should not be determined solely by the nature, range 
and effects of any resulting penalties, even when they affect the 
investments of non-personally culpable shareholders.  The criminal law 
addresses harms against the public perpetrated through harms against 
individuals; if the individual suffers a unique harm due to the corporate 
nature of the perpetrator, shareholders should not be able to avoid the 
 
 34. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 833, 857–58 (2000). 
 35. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 8, at 320. 
 36. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 972 
(2010). 
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financial ramifications of redressing this public harm any more than they 
should in the private tort context.  Furthermore, to the extent that society 
thinks of corporations as personified individuals, the condemnatory 
function of the criminal law—even apart from the sum of whatever 
financial sanctions it imposes—makes the criminal condemnation of a 
corporation as socially meaningful as it is with respect to an individual 
person. 
Furthermore, a body of scholarship on the so-called “utility of desert” 
has shown that this condemnatory function of punishment serves not 
only the moral or philosophical purposes of retribution but important 
utilitarian purposes as well.  Social science shows that people obey the 
law not out of a fear of criminal punishment so much as through a 
combination of normative social influence and internal moral rules (with 
social influence often shaping the rules themselves).37  There is evidence 
that these intuitions about just punishment are in fact shared among 
common citizens at an extremely nuanced level.38  Robinson and 
Kurzban argue that these intuitions generate specific determinations of 
deserved punishment for particular crimes, not simply floor or ceiling 
generalities about extremities of justice and injustice.39  Robinson and 
Darley have found that, due to the strength of these shared intuitions 
about guilt, the deviation from them in assigning punishment comes 
with great utilitarian risks; the law encourages greater obedience when it 
is perceived by the community to assign liability in “just” proportion to 
the moral blameworthiness of the offender.40  They argue that this is 
because “the ability of the criminal justice system to harness the power 
of stigmatization, to avoid subversion and vigilantism, to gain 
compliance in borderline cases, and to have a role in shaping societal 
norms is directly related to its ability to gain moral credibility from 
those to whom it applies.”41  Furthermore, though it is a hotly contested 
 
 37. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval 
and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980); 
Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837, 854 (1990); Raymond Paternoster & LeeAnn Iovanni, The Deterrent Effect of 
Perceived Severity: A Reexamination, 64 SOC. FORCES 751, 769 (1986). 
 38. See generally Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions 
of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007). 
 39. Id. at 1832–46.  The authors note that these concepts of desert are not absolute but relative, 
meaning that notions of desert do not flow from an understanding of a “magical” connection between a 
certain act and an appropriate amount of punishment in the abstract, but from a shared understanding of 
“the amount needed to set the offender in his appropriate relative position on the continuum of deserved 
punishment.”  Id. at 1835.  Certain societies may allow for more severe maximum or minimum 
punishments, but the intuitions about the relative personal blameworthiness of offenders across 
whatever spectrum exists will not change. 
 40. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law 
and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 41. Id. at 29–31 (citing, among other evidence, RICHARD PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, 
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question in the scholarship on law and economics, in areas in which 
social norms are in flux, the law may potentially contribute to the 
development of those norms in a particular direction.42 
With regard to corporations, entity liability might vindicate and shape 
social norms by virtue of the heightened visibility of corporate 
defendants.43  Samuel Buell notes that the expressive purpose of entity 
liability could be one of two things: either “its ability to shape norms by 
conveying disapproval of certain forms of crime” or, following the 
notion of the “utility of desert” developed by Robinson and Darley, “its 
ability to satisfy popular demand for retribution against corporations and 
therefore to advance general contentment or general respect for the 
law.”44  While not enough on its own to justify entity liability, the 
existence of norms about corporate moral culpability could therefore 
indicate substantial utilitarian costs to abolishing it.  In the next part, I 
will gather evidence suggesting that, not only do such social norms 
exist, but they exist in part due to legal protections and business 
practices that actually benefit the corporations themselves. 
III. LEGAL AND SOCIAL NORMS OF PERSONIFICATION 
The scholarship on the utility of desert suggests that the criminal law 
is most likely to facilitate obedience to the law not simply by threatening 
punishment but when its expressive force contributes to the 
development of background social norms against certain behavior.  
Likewise, where it fails to do so or when it runs counter to social norms, 
it is likely to diminish the legitimacy of the criminal law itself.  One 
question in thinking about corporate criminal liability, then, is whether 
criminalizing corporations in addition to their officers in appropriate 
cases contributes to the building of social norms against corporate 
 
ATTITUDES AND PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 62–69 (1996); Tilmann 
Betsch, Henning Plessner & Elke Schallies, The Value–Account Model of Attitude Formation, in 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 251–52 (Geoffrey Haddock & 
Gregory R. Maio eds., 2004); Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
of Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125 (Leonard Berkowitz 
ed., 1986); ELLIOT R. SMITH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 261–62 (2d ed. 2000). 
 42. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 24–37 (1991). 
 43. Buell, supra note 11, at 521 (“An expressive defense of entity criminal liability might say that 
the practice is a particularly influential way for criminal law to shape norms, perhaps because punishing 
firms has a salience that punishing individuals lacks.  In considering this claim, it is important to 
distinguish between communicating what conduct is wrong and communicating what conduct is wrong 
by various means.  Entity criminal liability adds nothing on the former score because it does not define 
an independent category of criminal behavior; enterprise liability is always derivative of an individual 
crime . . . .  That being said, entity criminal liability might have particular force, assuming it has some 
heightened visibility, in driving home the messages that criminal law has chosen to send.”). 
 44. Id. at 520. 
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crime.  A second question is, to the extent that social norms already 
consider corporations as capable of criminality in their collective forms, 
whether failing to criminalize corporations in appropriate cases would 
have the delegitimizing effect described above. 
As Susanna Ripken notes, the nature of the corporation changes 
depending on whether one views it through the lens of philosophy, law, 
moral theory, political science, sociology, psychology, organizational 
theory, theology, or economics but, “taken together, [these lenses] 
reveal that the corporation is a multidimensional person with coinciding 
and conflicting properties that defy classification into a neat and tidy 
unified theory.”45  Because the question of whether the debatable nature 
of corporate personhood requires corporate criminality, however, certain 
lenses are more useful than others.  I will examine those aspects of 
corporate personhood that relate to a corporation’s capacity to commit a 
legal wrong punishable by collective condemnation, which will consider 
the relationship between institutional identity and collective harm.  I will 
first consider the formal means through which the legal order personifies 
the corporation.  I will then turn to evidence of social norms that treat 
corporations as morally culpable persons. 
A. Legal Personification 
Pope Innocent IV is generally credited with the first articulation of the 
“legal fiction” view of the corporation for his description of 
ecclesiastical bodies as both distinct entities as a matter of social fact, 
yet spiritually personae fictae—lacking a body or will and thus not 
susceptible of excommunication.46  During the last two centuries, the 
 
 45. Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the 
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 167–68 (2009) (“Moral philosophy 
suggests the possibility that corporations are moral persons with the moral responsibility to act in ways 
that are just, and to conduct their business activities in accordance with moral norms that go beyond 
what the law requires.  Organization theory highlights the sociological and psychological dimensions of 
organizational behavior, demonstrating that the corporate person has its own character and culture, 
through which it not only exerts considerable influence over its internal members, but also maintains a 
certain image and an identifiable presence in society.  Political theory and philosophy shed a different 
light on the corporate person.  The lighting in one political pluralist setting casts the corporate person in 
the role of a mediating institution, serving as a buffer between the individual and the coercive power of 
the state.  However, the lighting in a contrasting pluralist setting reveals a corporate person who wields 
just as much power as the state.  This political power can pose a threat to democracy if left unchecked; 
the state must serve as a countervailing force to protect individuals from corporate power.  Religious 
thinkers focus on an entirely different aspect of the corporate person and see it as a center for the 
spiritual flourishing of its members and society.  By cultivating virtues and the common good in a 
manner that is unique to the corporate person, the corporation takes on theological significance.  
Economic theory emphasizes the contractual exchanges that are so critical to corporate activity; the 
corporation resembles a marketplace where individuals draw mutual benefits from their bargains with 
each other.”). 
 46. John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 
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jurisprudential debate over the nature of the corporate entity has 
frequently been conceptualized as a choice between two purported 
improvements on the ancient “legal fiction” model: “corporate realism,” 
which posits that a corporation’s legal personality is actually a 
manifestation of its real personality in society, and corporate 
“nominalism,” which holds it to be merely shorthand for describing a 
contractual arrangement amongst individual shareholders.47  Despite the 
“death” of corporate nominalism in the 1920’s, with the ascent of 
theories such as John Dewey’s claim that “‘person’ signifies what law 
makes it signify,”48 nominalism has been revived recently in the newer 
“contractual theory of the firm,” which describes corporations as “legal 
fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships 
among individuals.”49 
One of the many difficulties in any conception of corporate 
personhood is, as noted by many commentators—including Innocent IV 
when conceiving his original bifurcated theory of the organization—the 
very fact that a corporation is inherently “soulless;” an automated 
amalgam of individuals with no separate heart or mind.50  Others have 
argued that because corporate managers make decisions based upon 
external factors which sometimes relate to social benefit, these external 
factors can sometimes function as a corporate “conscience” insofar as 
they can produce “good” corporate behaviors.51  Whatever the 
 
664 (1926). 
 47. See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 584 (1999). 
 48. Dewey, supra note 46, at 655. 
 49. Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976).  In his legal history of the corporation Gregory Mark 
explains why the uncontroversial acceptance of the corporation as a legal person after World War II was 
a radical departure from the jurisprudential debates of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1441, 1441 (1987).  In the landmark early nineteenth century case Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward the Supreme Court held that a corporation owed its existence primarily to the government, 
rather than to its incorporators or constituents, and as a “creature of law” had only the rights and 
privileges granted to it by the government.  17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).  When states eventually shifted 
from attempting to regulate states through their charters to regulating the harm flowing from their 
activities, corporate lawyers attempted to protect corporate property from regulation by asserting a 
partnership-like model.  Mark, supra, at 1442.  This attempt, Mark argues, “laid the groundwork for the 
conception of the corporation as a real person, which saw the corporation as an autonomous, self-
directed entity in which rights inhered,” and that even later after “legal realists undermined the 
conception of rights, the terminology remained, bereft of its theoretical underpinnings.”  Id. 
 50. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 134 (3d ed. 2005); 
Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How We Identify a Corporate 
Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1646–47 (2002); RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: HOW 
CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE DO BAD THINGS 102 (1995). 
 51. See Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate 
“Conscience”, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1129 (2008). 
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theoretical justification for corporate “personhood,” the pervasiveness of 
the concept has substantial cultural weight.52  Doubtless, this is due in 
part to the fact that the law formally recognizes the corporation as an 
individual identity in a number of ways which impact the society in 
which the corporation acts. 
As the Revised Model Business Corporation Act states, “unless its 
articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation . . . has 
the same power as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient 
to carry out its business and affairs,” including bringing and defending 
lawsuits and owning and selling property.53  The corporate right to own 
property is constitutionally protected.  The corporation has most of the 
constitutional criminal procedural rights guaranteed to individuals, with 
all of the law enforcement tradeoffs such rights necessitate.54  And, as 
the Citizens United decision clarified, corporations even have free 
speech rights, such as the right to fund independent political broadcasts 
without campaign finance limits.55  This legal framework guarantees 
that, regardless of how one conceptualizes the internal structure of a 
corporation, the law has equipped it to act in society with many of the 
same protective legal buffers available to individuals. 
B. Cultural Personification  
The law’s personalized conception of corporations has translated into 
the culture in ways both quantitatively and qualitatively measurable.  
This section will survey evidence of social norms about the nature of the 
corporate person and demonstrate how many of these norms have in fact 
developed through the efforts of corporations themselves.  I will discuss 
two areas of research that suggest the existence of a pervasive cultural 
perception of the corporation as a personified actor with humanized and 
 
 52. Writing at the height of the Legal Realist movement, Thurman Arnold argued in The 
Folklore of Capitalism that the imagery of corporate personification coupled with American cultural 
ideals about individualism justified social acceptance of laissez faire policy toward corporations. 
THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 118–36, 185–230 (1937).  Because, he claimed, 
“[m]en cheerfully accept the fact that some individuals are good and others bad” and “since great 
industrial organizations were regarded as individuals, it was not expected that all of them would be 
good.”  Id. at 188.  Consequently, “[s]ince individuals are supposed to do better if let alone, this 
symbolism freed industrial enterprise from regulation in the interest of furthering any current morality.  
The laissez faire religion, based on a conception of a society composed of competing individuals, was 
transferred automatically to industrial organizations with nation-wide power and dictatorial forms of 
government.”  Id. 
 53. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 3.02 (1985). 
 54. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (recognizing Fourth Amendment protection 
from unreasonable searches and seizures); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 
(1977) (recognizing Fifth Amendment protection from double jeopardy); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 
531, 542 (1970) (recognizing Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury). 
 55. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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moral qualities.  The first considers the effects of a corporation’s “brand 
personality” on consumers.  The second considers the results of a 
corporation’s participation in cultural discourse on moral and social 
issues. 
1. The Emotionality of Brands 
An obvious way in which corporations function as persons in the 
social world is through their relationships with intended consumers.  
One study, for example, has shown that targeted marketing strategies 
demonstrating positive human qualities such as “commitment to family 
values” generated support from consumers.56  Scholars in the field of 
communications have empirically modeled the process through which a 
corporation’s materially observable characteristics translate for a 
consumer into a “personality attribution perception” through a process 
of personification; people form subjective perceptions of corporations 
through the apprehension and evaluation of human qualities.57  In other 
words, the ways in which individuals relate to corporations is through 
seeing them as people and reacting to them emotionally on that basis.  
For example, the perception of Allstate Insurance as a trustworthy 
caretaker in whose “good hands” one wants to be, or of Ben and Jerry’s 
Ice Cream as “laid back” and nature-loving. 
This process of evaluation also creates a relationship between the 
consumer and the entity in question; by projecting an internal dynamic 
onto an inanimate object a human being determines his relationship to 
the object itself.58  Because one attributes personality to brands, he can 
have a relationship with the personality and, consequently, develop 
emotions toward it.59  Corporations, of course, pay large sums of money 
to advertising executives to capitalize on precisely this phenomenon, 
deliberately crafting personalities most likely to connect with the target 
markets for their products. 
Furthermore, research shows that individuals’ perceptions of brands 
are often quite similar to one another and it is therefore possible to 
discern “shared” or “public brand meanings.”60  Bullmore has used the 
term “consensus of subjectivity” to describe the empirical phenomenon 
of numerous autonomous individual perceptions being discovered to be 
 
 56. Jay M. Handelman & Stephen J. Arnold, The Role of Marketing Actions with a Social 
Dimension: Appeals to the Institutional Environment, 63 J. MARKETING 33 (1999). 
 57. GIEP FRANZEN & SANDRA MORIARTY, THE SCIENCE AND ART OF BRANDING 242 (2008). 
 58. Mark S. Cary, Ad Strategy and the Stone Age Brain, J. ADVERTISING RES., Jan.–Apr. 2000, 
at 103–06. 
 59. Id. 
 60. FRANZEN & MORIARTY, supra note 57, at 245. 
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closely related.61  This supports the idea that shared social norms about 
the particular moral personification of a given corporation exist.  Yet the 
perceptions of brand personality experienced by either individuals or 
groups are not merely the marketing creations of a corporation itself; 
consumers “derive the personality of a brand on the basis of all their 
experiences with [it].”62  Thus, the personified social conception of a 
corporation can arise from bad actions unintended to contribute to the 
brand personality it deliberately constructs.  If a corporation does 
something to appear as a “bad actor,” this moral judgment can 
contribute to its personified public brand meaning. 
2. Corporations as Participants in Moral Discourse 
While the legal purpose of a corporation is to generate revenue for the 
shareholders that comprise it, it remains nonetheless the case that 
corporations participate in their collective capacities in the external 
moral discourse of society at large.  In other words, by selecting public 
relations messages with social welfare angles (for example, Chevron’s 
“People Do” environmental ads) or sponsoring charitable activities, the 
corporation becomes a coherent moral discussant in a public forum and 
affects the overall discourse that goes on there in the same way that an 
individual speaker might. 
The debate in the management literature over Corporate Social 
Responsibility—in general terms, over whether a corporation has legal, 
ethical, or philanthropic responsibilities beyond the economic duty to 
make money for its shareholders—is premised on the notion that a 
corporation may “choose” from among several sets of values.  While, as 
Colin Marks notes, this does not mean a corporation has a literal internal 
human conscience, it nonetheless makes social choices “influenced by 
external factors stemming, at least in part, from the corporation’s status 
as a social entity. . . .”63  From this fact, Marks proposes, “the 
corporation’s ‘conscience’ is a complex combination and interaction of 
social and market forces as well as the individual consciences of its 
corporate managers.”64  
Scholars of the communicative theory of the firm have drawn upon 
Habermas’ model of moral imperatives arising out of the consensus 
derived from social discourse to show how businesses participate in 
external moral discourse separately from, though related to, the 
communicative structures regulating their individual members.  
 
 61. JEREMY BULLMORE, BEHIND THE SCENES OF ADVERTISING (1998). 
 62. Id. at 246. 
 63. Marks, supra note 51, at 1150. 
 64. Id. 
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Corporations are both “bound by moral constraints in virtue of being 
institutions subject to the demands of public morality through legitimate 
law” and also “moral communities in which communicative action 
explains their ability to enhance the interests of all members.”65  This 
communicative formulation gives some structure to the intuition that 
corporations function as moral actors, and as more than simply the sum 
of the actions of their human employees.  In other words, a corporation’s 
unified moral stance to the outside world is something individualized 
and separate from its internal community comprised of individuals. 
Interestingly, some evidence suggests that, when faced with moral 
dilemmas, corporations function like individuals in their internal 
behavior as well.  The literature on organizational psychology 
demonstrates that corporations are capable of psychological reactions to 
their own misconduct that track with individual reactions to trauma but 
impose externalities on the world around them.66  During an oil spill, for 
example, Tarja Ketola has studied how “an organization, like an 
individual, needs to dose the pain it experiences, in order to survive 
from a blow” through psychological defense mechanisms: “denial gives 
time to comprehend what has happened, intellectualization makes the 
incident look logical, projection eases the guilty feelings and 
rationalization provides justifications.  All these defenses soothe the 
pain until the organization is mentally ready to sublimate its wrongdoing 
through compensation.”67 
These examples of how and why corporations adopt a morally 
inflected stance amidst the external cultural discourse point to the 
inevitability of social norms about corporations as conscience-endowed 
individuals.  Regardless of the corporate purposes behind expressions of 
social concern—or of guilt—corporations still present individualized 
personalities to the world in which they act, and those personalities 
behave as though making moral choices through their actions. 
 
 65. Jeffery D. Smith, A Précis of a Communicative Theory of the Firm, 13 BUS. ETHICS: A 
EUROPEAN REV. 317, 329–30 (2004). 
 66. See, e.g., Andrew D. Brown, Narcissism, Identity, and Legitimacy, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
643 (1997) (finding that the “self esteem” of organizations is regulated through such ego defenses); see 
also Andrew D. Brown & Ken Starkey, Organizational Identity and Learning: A Psychodynamic 
Perspective, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 102 (2000); R. DE BOARD, THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF 
ORGANIZATIONS (1978); Stephen Fineman, Emotional Subtexts in Corporate Greening, 17 ORG. STUD. 
479 (1996); Larry Hirschhorn & Donald R. Young, Dealing with the Anxiety of Working: Social 
Defenses as Coping Strategy, in ORGANIZATIONS ON THE COUCH: CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND CHANGE 215–40 (1991). 
 67. T. Ketola, Corporate Psychological Defenses: An Oil Spill Case, 65 J. BUS. ETHICS 149, 149 
(2006). 
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3. Concluding Observations 
Certainly many commentators have noted the social phenomenon of 
discussing collective entities in the language of individual 
responsibility.68  A 1993 poll after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, for 
example, found that 87% of respondents felt “very angry” or “somewhat 
angry” toward “the companies involved.”69  Likewise, when a January 
2002 Fox News Poll, asked whether the “collapse of Enron” should be 
classified as a “political scandal,” a “financial scandal” or a “criminal 
scandal,” the greatest number of respondents, 39%, considered it a 
“criminal scandal” (the second greatest number, 24%, considered it 
“mixed,” with 21% considering it financial, only 6% considering it 
political and 10% unsure).70  In two different 2010 polls following the 
BP oil spill, the majority of respondents, 56% and 65% respectively, felt 
that the federal government should pursue criminal charges against BP 
and “other companies” involved (42% and 51% respectively felt so 
“strongly”).71  These numbers exceed the 53% of respondents to a 
different, similarly timed poll who approved of the government “filing 
criminal charges against employees and executives at BP.”72  
These examples all suggest the existence of shared social norms about 
the corporation as a personified moral actor that can be culpable for its 
misconduct.  Yet, the desire to vindicate social disapproval and thereby 
reap the utilitarian benefits of legitimacy cannot be the only 
justifications for imposing criminal punishment; otherwise we would 
resort to a system of mob justice.  The fact remains that the law cannot, 
in order to realize utilitarian goals such as legitimacy, rightfully punish 
beyond the limits of harm actually caused by a criminal act.73  So the 
 
 68. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 11, at 493 (“Where [institutional] effects make the difference in 
how someone behaves, we need the institutional referent to say so.  Consider how we speak coherently 
and continuously about institutions while membership changes.”); PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN 
LAW AND MORALITY 41 (2002) (“[I]n day-to-day life we have little difficulty attributing moral 
responsibility to corporations and other groups, and the law is not alone in recognizing group 
responsibility.”); Ripken, supra note 45, at 139 (“If the corporation is considered a member of society, 
deeper normative questions arise regarding its role and responsibilities…we might also question whether 
corporations bind our society together by facilitating the fulfillment of society’s beliefs, hopes, and 
promises.”). 
 69. NAT’L FAMILY OP. RESEARCH, PORTER/NOVELLI CRISIS SURVEY (June 1993), available at 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html. 
 70. FOX NEWS & OPINION DYNAMICS, POLL (Jan. 2002), available at 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html. 
 71. ABC NEWS & WASH. POST, POLL (July 2010), available at 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html; ABC NEWS & WASH. POST, POLL (June 
2010), available at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html 
 72. CNN/OP. RESEARCH CORP., POLL (June 2010), available at 
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html. 
 73. See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968); JEREMY 
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question becomes whether corporate crime can be said to produce 
additional harm beyond that which can be attributed to the responsible 
employees in their individual capacities.  In other words, does the 
existence of a corporation produce harm that is distinguishable from that 
for which the law of conspiracy could punish the group of underlying 
employees that agrees to engage in the same primary behavior?  I argue 
that the collective structural qualities of corporations—particularly when 
coupled with the personified moral qualities discussed previously—
produce such harm. 
IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE HARMS OF BRIBERY 
To begin to make this claim, I first turn to the specific crime of 
bribery of government officials for business consideration, which has 
made legal headlines over the last few years due to a dramatic upswing 
in enforcement of the FCPA, which punishes U.S. issuers for their 
bribery of officials abroad.  Because such crimes by definition take 
place in a commercial context, it is a particularly fertile ground for 
exploring the unique harms imposed by corporate crime.  Until the 
boom in FCPA enforcement, the crime of bribery had been somewhat 
neglected in the scholarly literature.74  Furthermore, as a quick Westlaw 
search reveals, the lion’s share of recent empirical scholarship on 
bribery has focused on its effects in developing countries, as opposed to 
the domestic context, due in part to the efforts of international 
anticorruption NGOs.75  The debates over the “federalization” of 
domestic public corruption prosecutions further illuminate the nature of 
the harm criminalized in the form of bribery.76  
In this Part, I identify what I call the “perceptual harms” imposed on 
society by a corporate entity engaging in bribery of government 
officials.  I argue that—due to the enduring nature of the corporation, 
and the systemic interconnections between a corporate structure and the 
government entities with which it interacts—many of these perceptual 
harms arise from the existence of the corporate structure itself. 
 
BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1830). 
 74. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, For God, for Country, or for Me?, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 
1480 (1986) (reviewing John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes (1984)) (noting the dearth of work on bribery at the 
time of Noonan’s book). 
 75. See generally BENJAMIN S. BUCKLAND, GLOBAL ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS: THE ROLE OF 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (2007). 
 76. See generally George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? Mail Fraud, State 
Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225 (1997). 
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A. Bribery and Public Confidence 
The debate over the exact nature of the “wrong” represented by 
bribery has been age-old and largely culturally contingent.  Most 
definitions turn on the core elements of: (1) a benefit passing to a public 
official, (2) the exercise of authority, and (3) some form of reciprocity 
but, as John Noonan notes in one of the most comprehensive existing 
treatments of the subject, the meanings of each of these elements vary 
according to the standards of a particular time and culture.77  The 
behavior that counts as a bribe must therefore first be defined politically 
and socially in order to warrant the public moral condemnation of the 
criminal law.78  The federal domestic anti-bribery statute, for example, 
prohibits giving or promising to give a “thing of value” to a federal 
official in exchange for a specific official action.79   
Regardless of precise definitions, most point to the deterioration of 
“public confidence” in governmental institutions as the general category 
of harm sought to be punished through the criminalization of bribery.80  
Daniel Lowenstein suggests the idea of “stewardship” as a framework 
for understanding this problem: both the increasing complexity and 
technological advancement of society create legal, political, and other 
institutional arrangements in which some parties act as stewards for the 
interests of other beneficiaries.81  This creates the danger that third 
parties will offer benefits to the stewards that do not advantage the 
beneficiaries, a situation which the very “ethical, legal, political, social, 
or economic values gave rise to the stewardship obligation in the first 
place” may be invoked to rectify.82  This definition makes it easy to see 
how part of what is at stake in talk of “public confidence” is actually the 
sum of individual reactions to a structural arrangement in which his or 
her well-being is improperly subordinated to a reciprocal relationship 
between a more powerful steward and a third party.  In such a case, as 
Lowenstein notes, this political structure must police itself by imposing 
restraints on such risks through the criminal law. 
In the United States, the “public confidence” casualties of bribery 
 
 77. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES xi (1984). 
 78. See Lowenstein, supra note 74, at 1510. 
 79. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961) (stating 
that a “democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound 
to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of 
malfeasance and corruption”); H. R. Rep. No. 87-748, at 2 (1961) (noting as a reason motivating the  
domestic bribery law, 18 U.S.C. § 201, a “consensus of public expressions” on the subject of conflict of 
interest breaches in the Executive Branch of the federal government). 
 81. Lowenstein, supra note 74, at 1482. 
 82. Id. 
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were never more apparent than in the mood of heightened suspicion of 
corporate corruption that came on the heels of the Watergate scandal in 
the mid-1970s.  Shortly after Watergate, SEC investigations had 
revealed that more than 400 U.S. companies had made improper 
payments totaling more than $300 million to foreign government 
officials in exchange for business.83  A 1976 Gallup poll revealed that 
while a majority of respondents (58%) believed the bribes to be the 
actions of a few dishonest individuals, a substantial minority (37%) 
considered the misconduct to be “the usual practices of business in 
general.”84  
This crisis in confidence elicited several notable government 
responses, which contributed to a clearer political definition of bribery 
in the United States.  First, federal prosecutors began to rely on the 
public’s “intangible right” to the honest services of its employees as a 
basis for bringing prosecutions under the mail fraud statute against 
corrupt government employees whose conduct did not involve the 
explicit transfer of money required to state a charge under the bribery 
statute.85  In United States v. Mandel, for example, the court held that 
the Maryland governor’s business dealings with entities seeking to 
benefit from state legislation on race tracks constituted fraud because 
“the public is not receiving what it expects and is entitled to, the public 
official’s honest and faithful service.”86  Second, prosecutors began 
more frequently to utilize the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO), which includes the violation of the federal 
bribery statute as a predicate offense, to prosecute “patterns” of bribery 
in police departments, mayoralties, state legislatures, and gubernatorial 
offices in the same manner as they pursued members of organized crime 
syndicates.87  This practice recognized the structural similarities between 
“the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate 
organizations operating in interstate commerce,” which RICO sought to 
eliminate,88 and the illicit networks of power created by business 
interests entering into agreements with corrupt officials.  In both 
situations, innocent third parties—citizens and consumers—suffer 
through the unfair and systemic distortion of the commercial playing 
field by self-interested actors with means to enforce their priorities. 
 
 83. See United States v. O’Grady, 742 F.2d 682, 701 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 84. Gallup Organization, Gallup/Newsweek Poll # 1976-946K: Political Attitudes Survey 
(1976). 
 85. Joshua A. Kobrin, Betraying Honest Services: Theories of Trust and Betrayal Applied to the 
Mail Fraud Statute and § 1346, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 779, 790 (2006). 
 86. 591 F.2d 1347, 1354–55, 1362 (4th Cir. 1979). 
 87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961–68 (2006). 
 88. S. Rep. No. 617, at 76 (1969). 
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Third, Congress enacted the FCPA, intended to prevent the bribing of 
foreign officials by corporations doing business abroad.89  When he 
signed the Act on December 19, 1977, President Jimmy Carter 
suggested that one of the goals of the Act was to prevent the public 
perceptions arising from pessimistic attitudes about the relationships 
between corporations and government: “[c]orrupt practices between 
corporations and public officials overseas undermine the integrity and 
stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries.  
Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public 
confidence in our basic institutions.”90  Carter’s words point to the fact 
that a particular aspect of the crisis in “public confidence” the Act was 
intended to resolve related, like RICO, to the institutional relationship 
between corporate structures and government authorities.  To 
understand whether the relationship between a corporation and 
government authority created by bribery produces a unique brand of 
harm, it is necessary to look below the generalized concern over “public 
confidence” threatened by all instances of bribery and examine the 
components of the harm produced by a corporate bribe. 
B. The Structure of Corporate Bribery 
Bribery is a somewhat unusual crime, both on account of the 
diffuseness of the harm attributable to an individual act and the indirect 
and various identities of its victims.  Philip Nichols has identified 
several of the more extreme examples: the tens of thousands of people 
killed in Turkey after their homes—built after contractors had “bribed 
their way around Turkey’s building codes”—collapsed in an 
 
 89. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended in sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78) amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff) and 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff).  The FCPA consists of three classes of prohibitions: 
first, the payment or offer to pay anything of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain business 
(“anti-bribery” provisions); second, failure to maintain adequate books and records to fully reflect all 
transactions (“books and records” provision); and, third, failure to maintain effective internal accounting 
controls (“internal controls” provision).  The latter two apply only to issuers listed on U.S. stock 
exchanges and are therefore enforced primarily by the SEC, as opposed to the anti-bribery provisions, 
which are enforced, both criminally and civilly, primarily by the DOJ.  Subsequent to the 1998 
amendments to the FCPA, the anti-bribery provisions apply to U.S. persons (regardless of where the 
misconduct occurred), foreign and domestic companies doing business in the United States, companies 
traded on U.S. exchanges or registered with the SEC, and foreign persons or companies who perform 
any act within U.S. territory in furtherance of a bribe. 
 90. John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters,:Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure 
Bill Statement on Signing S. 305 Into Law, The American Presidency Project, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7036. 
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earthquake,91and the collapse of the Sampoong department store in 
Seoul, South Korea, which killed over 300 people under similarly 
corrupt circumstances.92  
The economic victims of bribery are even more multitudinous.  
Corruption dissuades foreign investment in underdeveloped economies 
where such investment is necessary to spur technological innovation and 
create jobs.93  According to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, the most corrupt states are the most impoverished, and 
“a country’s improvement in the Corruption Perception Index ranking 
by even one point . . . increases capital inflows by 0.5 percent of a 
country’s gross domestic product and average incomes by as much as 4 
percent.”94 
These facts suggest that, by its very nature, bribery harms not only 
through the immediate counterfactuals it precludes (the winning of a 
specific contract by another firm that could build to code, for example) 
but by the harms that flow from social perceptions of alliances between 
corporate interests and the structures of power.95  These perceptions, as 
Nichols notes, can become self-reinforcing: corruption undermines the 
legitimacy of government and destroys popular hope for change and 
efforts to reform.96  In short, the citizens of a corrupt state tend to 
 
 91. Philip M. Nichols, The Myth of Anti-bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 627, 627 (2000). 
 92. Id. at 627–28. 
 93. See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1307, 
1316–17 (2004) (citing Ray Barrell & Nigel Pain, Foreign Direct Investment, Technological Change, 
and Economic Growth Within Europe, 107 ECON. J. 1770, 1770 (1997) and Glenn Firebaugh, Growth 
Effects of Foreign and Domestic Investment, 98 AM. J. SOC. 105, 105 (1992)). 
 94. See Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope 
of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 427 (2009) (citing 
Transparency Int’l, Persistently High Corruption in Low-Income Countries Amounts to an “Ongoing 
Humanitarian Disaster” 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/36589/575262 (quotations omitted)). 
 95. Commenting on a 2001 Gallup survey which found that 33% of 779 multinational executives 
believed that the problem of corruption in the business world was worsening, Transparency International 
Chairman Peter Eigen said that “the data provides a disturbing picture of the degree to which leading 
exporting countries are perceived to be using corrupt practices.” See New Poll Shows Many Leading 
Exporters Using Bribes, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, Oct. 26, 1999 (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi-bpi. 
 96. Nichols, supra note 93, at 1319–20 (“Corruption delegitimizes governments and undermines 
support for change, particularly market-oriented change. Susan Rose-Ackerman powerfully summarizes 
the social affects [sic]  of corruption and its detrimental effect on the legitimacy of governments: 
‘Citizens may come to believe that the government is simply for sale to the highest bidder.  Corruption 
undermines claims that the government is substituting democratic values for decisions based on ability 
to pay.  It can lead to coups by un-democratic leaders’ . . . .  There are two effects that are particularly 
acute in emerging economies.  The first is that popular support for reform erodes, and the absence of 
that support can seriously undermine the possibility of positive change.  The other effect is harder to 
quantify, but has far more of a human face: corruption contributes to miserable social conditions.”) 
(citing Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL 
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distrust government, leading to an overall sense of the hopelessness of 
attempting to work within existing legal parameters.97  Corruption also 
leads to a pervasive cultural malaise which renders the individual 
helpless alongside institutional structures.98 
As an example, consider post-Cold War Russia, notorious for its 
pandemic of bribery at all levels of society.99  Though perhaps the 
country’s recent entry into the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (the “OECD”) signals a new course, Russia had, over 
the last 20 years, become one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world.100 In 2005 the World Bank found that 78% of businesses in 
Russia reported having to pay bribes and Russia’s Foreign Investment 
Advisory Council found that 71% of businesses considered corruption 
the biggest barrier to foreign investment.101  An OECD study listed 
corruption as one of the most significant obstacles to reform in the 
country.102  Furthermore, the brutal hazing of young men conscripted to 
serve their mandatory two years of service in the Russian military has 
been exacerbated by the widespread availability of medical exemptions 
for those with the money to pay bribes for them.103  The disproportionate 
percentage of conscripts coming from broken homes or criminal 
backgrounds has been pointed to as a reason for the dearth of qualified 
 
ECONOMY 31, 44 (Kimberly Ann Elliott ed., 1997)); see also Martin Davies, Just (Don’t) Do It: Ethics 
and International Trade, 21 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 601, 614 (1997). 
 97. See A.W. Cragg, Business, Globalization, and the Logic and Ethics of Corruption, 53 INT’L 
J. 643, 654 (1998); Herbert H. Werlin, The Consequences of Corruption: The Ghanaian Experience, 88 
POL. SCI. Q. 71, 79 (1973). 
 98. One reason for the self-perpetuating nature of beliefs about corruption may come from the 
phenomenon identified in psychology as the “availability heuristic,” which describes the relationship 
between the perceived likelihood of an event based upon how easily an example may be brought to 
mind.  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCIENCE 1124–31 (1974).  Classic examples of the cognitive biases explained by this phenomenon 
include the tendency to be more concerned about plane crashes than car crashes, due to the high profile 
nature of plane crashes and the ensuing media coverage, or to underestimate the risks of smoking due to 
available examples of personal acquaintances who lived long lives despite being smokers. Even in a 
reasonably uncorrupt society, then, high profile examples of bribery have the potential to generate a 
disproportionate degree of cynicism about government. 
 99. The Indem Foundation estimated, in 2008, that Russians pay $319 billion annually in bribes. 
See Peter Finn, Taking on Russia’s Ubiquitous Bribery, WASHINGTON POST, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/13/AR2008071301928.html. 
 100. 143th out of 180th according to one ranking.  TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2007), available at 
http://archive.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007. 
 101. See Steven Lee Meyers, Pervasive Corruption in Russia is ‘Just Called Business,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F03E2DC153EF930A2575BC0A9639C8B63&pagew
anted=1. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Victim of Hazing Andre Sychev Becomes Symbol of Russian Military Corruption, 
PRAVDA, Sept. 2, 2006, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/09-02-2006/75688-sychev-0/. 
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junior officers and the perpetuation of abuse by those whose job it 
should be to curtail it.104 
Despite the complexity and demonstrable severity of the harms 
bribery imposes on the Russian populace, recent data suggest that 
Russians themselves may have ceased to find it normatively wrong.  In a 
2006 Gallup poll, 44% of Russians surveyed consider it morally 
acceptable to bribe “nurses or doctors in order to get better care in the 
hospital,” and close to a third (33%) consider it morally acceptable to 
give a bribe in order to have a child admitted to a college or 
university.105  Among 15–24 year-olds, 42% considered such bribes to 
universities to be morally acceptable.106  Significantly, Russian business 
entrepreneurs appear both more likely to give bribes (called “blat” in the 
normal business context) than any other group and to deem it morally 
acceptable.  The poll revealed that 47% of respondents identifying as 
business owners reported having given bribes in the previous twelve 
months.  Furthermore, respondents who stated they had even thought 
about starting their own businesses were significantly more likely than 
those who had never done so to consider each type of bribe listed as 
morally acceptable: 56% thought it was morally acceptable to bribe 
nurses or doctors and 46% to pay bribes to get their child into a 
university.107  And 32% of respondents who had thought about starting 
their own businesses said they have given bribes in the prior 12 months 
(compared to 21% for the entire population).108 
Yet other research strongly suggests that even among societies in 
which corruption is endemic, it is nonetheless deemed unacceptable.  
Studies in Sierra Leone,109 Kazakhstan,110 Mongolia and Bulgaria111—
all countries with pervasive corruption problems—all found that the 
majority of citizens studied found corruption harmful and opposed it. 
 
 104. See Jeremy Bransten, Russia: Military Conscripts Caught in Deadly ‘Cycle of Violence,’  
Radio Free Eur., Oct. 21, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055451.html. 
 105. Sergei Gradirovski & Neli Esipova, Corruption in Russia: Is Bribery Always Wrong?, 
GALLUP, Nov. 15, 2006, http://www.gallup.com/poll/25456/corruption-russia-bribery-always-
wrong.aspx. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. SAHR JOHN KPUNDEH, POLITICS AND CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF SIERRA 
LEONE 161–66, 172 (1995) (finding that 83.8% of interviewees believed that a new government should 
put a high priority on combating corruption). 
 110. Philip M. Nichols, The Fit Between Changes to the International Corruption Regime and 
Indigenous Perceptions of Corruption in Kazakhstan, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 863, 927 (2001) 
(finding that 96% of respondents believed fighting corruption should be a high government priority). 
 111. Philip M. Nichols, George J. Siedel & Matthew Kasdin, Corruption as a Pan-Cultural 
Phenomenon: An Empirical Study in Countries at Opposite Ends of the Former Soviet Empire, 39 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 215, 231 (2004) (finding that almost half of Bulgarians surveyed and over a third of 
Mongolians ranked corruption as the most serious social problem of the listed choices). 
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These data suggest several important things about the criminalization 
of bribery generally, and about corporate criminal liability for bribery 
specifically, from a utilitarian perspective.  First, it is an area where 
social norms may be unsettled, and where the criminal law may do 
significant expressive work to the extent that it can build norms against 
it.  Second, and relatedly, the failure to punish bribery is, at a minimum, 
closely correlated with an observable delegitimizing of the legal 
structures of the countries that allow it.  Third, as the recent data from 
Russia suggest, the existence of a business context is associated with a 
greater tolerance of bribery in general—to the extent that individuals 
identify as proprietors of businesses, they are more willing to buy into 
existing networks of corruption across all sectors of society.  This 
suggests that encouraging a view of bribery as a “corporate crime” has 
the expressive benefit of attacking this lower, business-associated moral 
standard responsible for this second set of bribery-friendly norms.  As 
stated previously, however, the fact that we can derive these utilitarian 
benefits from punishing corporations for their employees’ participation 
in schemes of bribery is not in and of itself sufficient to support entity 
liability. 
Several specific examples from recent FCPA enforcement actions 
will demonstrate how at the heart of the harm flowing from the crime of 
bribery is the perception of impermeable networks of power between 
business interests and corrupt governments.  I argue that the temporally 
enduring and physically pervasive nature of the corporate structure 
intensifies these perceptual harms.  It is these harms, linked to the 
structure of the corporation itself, that justify imposing entity liability in 
addition to liability for participating individual employees in cases 
where corruption can be said to pervade the corporate structure. 
1. Siemens 
In 2008, Siemens AG and three of its subsidiaries pleaded guilty to 
the largest FCPA settlement in history.  The criminal information 
alleged that Siemens had paid more than $800 million in corrupt 
payments between 2001 and 2007, as well as $1.7 million in kickbacks 
to the Iraqi government in connection with the United Nations Oil-For-
Food Program.112  Among other things, the information alleged that 
Siemens Argentina conspired to make bribes to Argentinian officials in 
exchange for work on a $1 billion project to develop a national ID card; 
Siemens Bangladesh channeled bribes to the son of the Prime Minister 
 
 112. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html. 
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of Bangladesh along with Telecommunications and Procurement 
officials in connection with a $40.9 million mobile telephone contract; 
and Siemens Venezuela paid $19 million in bribes to Venezuelan 
government officials in connection with mass transit systems in the 
cities of Valencia and Maracaibo.113  (The criminal information also 
mentioned bribery schemes in Israel, Mexico, Vietnam, China and 
Russia).114  The complexity and pervasiveness of the bribery undertaken 
by Siemens prompted one commenter to suggest that the Siemens 
scandal was to bribery what genocide is to murder for the purposes of 
moving a crime into “the realm of universally actionable rights” under 
principles of international law.115  All in all, Siemens was alleged to 
have made $1.1 billion in profits from its corrupt transactions. 
2. Technip/Snamproghetti/Halliburton/JCG 
Technip, a French engineering company, and Snamproghetti, a Dutch 
engineering company, participated in a joint venture with Halliburton 
subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root, to win Engineering, Procurement 
and Construction (EPC) contracts to expand the Bonny Island liquid 
natural gas plant for Nigeria LNG Limited, which is owned in part by 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.116  From August 1994 
until June 2004, Technip and Halliburton—which had succeeded in 
winning four contracts in connection with the Bonny Island Project—
paid bribes totaling around $182 million to a number of Nigerian 
government officials, including officials in the executive branch, 
employees of the government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation, and employees of government-controlled Nigeria LNG 
Limited.117  To conceal the bribes, the joint venture entered into sham 
consulting or services agreements with intermediaries and held “cultural 
meetings” where the joint venture partners and their agents made 
arrangements to pay the bribes.118 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; Brief for Plaintiff, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) at 
21, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens-ag-info.pdf; Complaint, United States v. 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), available at 
http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/0b9/0b9f5f40b093e1b889103edb2943ac7f.pdf?i=a8c51dd2f3db4606463
ae15fac9da788. 
 115. Matt A. Vega, Balancing Judicial Cognizance and Caution: Whether Transnational 
Corporations are Liable for Foreign Bribery Under the Alien Tort Statute, 31 MICH. J. INT’L L. 385, 
442 (2010). 
 116. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty, June 28, 2010, available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-751.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; Brief for Plaintiff, United States v. Technip, S.A. (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010) at 9, 
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It is perhaps not a coincidence that Nigeria, repeatedly listed as one of 
the most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International, 
also contains one of the five most polluted spots on Earth: the Niger 
River delta, the site of the oil around which much of Nigerian corruption 
is centered.119  For the last half century, the equivalent of one Exxon 
Valdez worth of oil is spilled in Nigeria every year, and the discharge of 
the gas that is a byproduct of drilling causes rain “so acidic that 
corrugated iron roofs quickly turn to rust.”120  The life expectancy of a 
Nigerian living in the Delta is seven years lower than in the rest of the 
country.  Nigeria is also one of the most impoverished nations on earth 
with 80% of the profit from its oil experts ending up in the hands of one 
percent of the population.121  With Nigerian public officials neutralized 
by foreign bribery—or “settled,” as Nigerians call it—crusading former 
prosecutor Nuhu Ribadu explained, “[u]nless we address the problem of 
corruption there isn o hope, there is no future.”122  
3. Daimler 
German automotive manufacturer Daimler AG and its subsidiaries 
paid hundreds of bribes worth tens of millions of dollars to officials in at 
least twenty-two countries including China, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Latvia, Nigeria, Russia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Vietnam, for assistance in securing government contracts valued at 
hundreds of millions of dollars.123  According to the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) press release, bribe payments were often identified 
internally and recorded as “commissions,” “special discounts,” or 
“nützliche Aufwendungen” or “N.A.” payments, which translates to 
“useful payment” or “necessary payment,” and were “understood by 
certain Daimler employees to mean ‘official bribe.’”124  Daimler also 




 119. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009: CORRUPTION 
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, 200–03 (2009), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_report_2009; Sam Kennedy, Nigeria: 
The Hidden Cost of Corruption, PBS.ORG, Apr. 24, 2009, 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/04/nigeria-the-hidden-cost-of-corruption.html. 
 120. Kennedy, supra note 120. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Daimler AG and Three Subsidiaries 
Resolve Foreign Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal Penalties, Apr. 
1, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-360.html. 
 124. Id. 
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in connection with contracts to sell vehicles to Iraq under the United 
Nation’s Oil for Food program.125  
4. Alcatel-Lucent 
Telecommunications firm Alcatel-Lucent’s three subsidiaries paid 
millions of dollars in bribes to officials in Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Malaysia and Taiwan and violated the internal controls and books and 
records provisions of the FCPA related to the hiring of third-party 
agents in Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Angola, 
Ivory Coast, Uganda and Mali.126  Overall, the company earned 
approximately $48.1 million in profits resulting from the bribes.127 
Specifically, according to the DOJ press release, Alcatel CIT wired 
more than $18 million to two consultants in Costa Rica, more than half 
of which they passed on to various Costa Rican government officials for 
assisting Alcatel CIT and Alcatel de Costa Rica in getting business.128  
The consultants then created phony invoices that they submitted to 
Alcatel CIT.  Senior Alcatel executives approved the payments to the 
consultants despite the fact that they were performing little or no 
legitimate work.129  As a result of this arrangement, Alcatel CIT won 
three contracts in Costa Rica worth a combined total of more than $300 
million as a result of corrupt payments to government officials and 
reaped a profit of more than $23 million.130  For his role in this scheme, 
Alcatel executive Christian Sapsazian was sentenced, in 2008, to 30 
months in prison.131 
In December 2010 the Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of 
Costa Rica (ICE)—whose directors and employees were the recipients 
of the Alcatel bribes—petitioned a court for “protection of its rights as a 
victim” of the scheme, arguing that “it is universally recognized, in a 
scheme for bribery, that an entity whose employees accept improper 
benefits to affect corporate decisions is a victim.”132  ICE further 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries 
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation, Dec. 27, 2010, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Roger M. Witten et al., Bloomberg, The Increased Prosecution of Individuals Under the 
FCPA: Trends and Implications (2010), available at 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId=92056. 
 132. See Brief for Petitioner, In re Instituto Corstarricense de Electricidad, No. 10-CR-20906, 
(11th Cir. June 15, 2011), available at http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/search/label/Alcatel-Lucent ; 
see also FCPA Professor, http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/search/label/Alcatel-Lucent (last visited 
32
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss1/5
2012] PERCEPTUAL HARM AND THE CORPORATE CRIMINAL 257 
contended that “the notion that acceptance of bribes by five of ICE’s 
more than 16,500 employees, managers, and directors necessarily 
renders ICE an active participant in Alcatel’s admitted bribery scheme is 
nonsense.” 
Alcatel Standard hired a consultant in Honduras who was personally 
selected by the brother of a senior Honduran government official, 
despite being a perfume distributor with no experience in 
telecommunications.133  According to the DOJ press release, Alcatel CIT 
executives knew that a significant portion of the money paid to the 
consultant would be paid to the family of the senior Honduran 
government official in exchange for favorable treatment of Alcatel 
CIT.134  As a result of these payments, Alcatel CIT won contracts worth 
approximately $47 million and from which it earned $870,000.135 
Alcatel Standard also retained two consultants on behalf of another 
Alcatel subsidiary in Taiwan to assist in obtaining an axle counting 
contract worth approximately $19.2 million.136  Alcatel paid these two 
consultants more than $950,000, despite the fact that neither consultant 
had telecommunications experience, so that Alcatel SEL could funnel 
payments through them to Taiwanese legislators who could influence 
the awarding of the contract.  Alcatel earned approximately $4.34 
million from this contract.137 
C. General Observations 
The details of these FCPA actions yield several observations.  First, 
the misconduct at issue in all of them took place across a number of 
geographic regions and over many years.  While individual corrupt deals 
could be attributed to specific employees, without the enduring nature of 
the corporate entity, and the organizational structure allowing it to 
operate in a consistently corrupt manner in so many countries at once, 
the same level of harm could not have been accomplished.  In other 
words, a corporation like Siemens is able to marshal so much financial 
and political capital to commit a single act of bribery in one place and 
 
Dec. 30, 2012). 
 133. See Brief for Petitioner, In re Instituto Corstarricense de Electricidad, No. 10-CR-20906, 
(11th Cir. June 15, 2011), available at http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/search/label/Alcatel-Lucent ; 
see also FCPA PROFESSOR, http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/search/label/Alcatel-Lucent (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2012). 
 134. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,, Alcatel-Lucent S. A. and Three 
Subsidiaries Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation, Dec. 27, 
2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. 
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time in part due to the existence of a sustained machinery of corruption 
built up over many places and times.  Furthermore, at the level of causal 
mechanics, one can point to the omission of corporate efforts to fulfill 
the corporation’s legal duty to prevent bribery as a cause of each 
individual act.  The harm that each act causes cannot, then, be entirely 
attributed to the individual employees directly responsible for that act of 
bribery.  The harms themselves in terms of public confidence are, so to 
speak, greater than the sum of their parts.  And the negligent failure to 
prevent them can properly be attributed to the corporation as a 
collective. 
Second, the nature of the harms of bribery can be characterized, in 
part, as rendering visible the link between private, corporate power and 
government power—the power, to use the Nigerian colloquialism, of 
“settling” the relevant government interest.  The examples of 
misconduct related to the Oil for Food Program demonstrate this harm at 
a particularly rarified level—one at which corporations, a corrupt 
totalitarian regime; and the supra-national structure of the United 
Nations cost the Iraqi population $1.8 billion in aid.138  But in all cases, 
this visible link is so harmful because it causes individuals in a society 
to feel helpless in the face of coordinated power, and deters outside 
market actors from positive intervention.139  While we lack the same 
amount of literature on these effects in the domestic context, this 
structure suggests the underlying content of the crisis in United States 
“public confidence” surrounding corporate interactions with government 
institutions that Carter cited as the driving motivation behind the FCPA. 
Third, the visible relationship between corporate crime and this sort 
of perceptual harm, which is so clear in bribery cases, can inform our 
thinking about corporate criminal liability generally.  As I will explore 
in the next section, when victims of an oil spill speak of “helplessness” 
and the enduring nature of the corporate structure relative to their 
deceased love ones, they suffer the same sort of harm—derived from 
perceptions of the relationship between corporate and legal power—as 
the Nigerian population experiences in the face of “settling.”  This harm 
is larger than the actions of any discrete set of individual actors and can 
only be vindicated through expressive condemnation of the larger 
 
 138. See generally INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMMITTEE, MANIPULATION OF THE OIL-FOR-FOOD 
PROGRAMME BY THE IRAQI REGIME (2005), available at 
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/13894/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/b2775461
-f442-4575-b746-9c038d3c8bb6/en/ManipulationReport.pdf. 
 139. See notes 92–93, supra, and supporting text.  The helplessness of the Nigerian populace is 
reflected in the results of a 2012 Gallup Poll, taken after widespread protests erupted over the 
government’s decision to suddenly remove fuel subsidies: 94% of Nigerians believed corruption was 
widespread.  Steve Crabtree, Almost All Nigerians Say Gov’t is Corrupt, GALLUP WORLD, Jan. 16, 
2012, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/152057/almost-nigerians-say-gov-corrupt.aspx. 
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structure that produces it. 
V. THE CORPORATE FORM AND THE EXPERIENCE OF HARM 
The example of bribery shows us how the enduring temporal 
existence of a corrupt corporation and its interdependence with its 
corrupt government clients results in specific perceptual harms to a 
society, including the sense of helplessness felt by individual victims 
and the discouragement of investors.  If one steps back for a moment, 
however, one can see how those same structural corporate features of 
permanence and interconnectedness may not only yield increased harm 
in the criminal context of bribery, but in many other criminal contexts.  
Even in cases where no actual criminal relationship exists between a 
corporation and a relevant government entity, the political 
interdependence between corporations, their lobbyists, and the 
government bureaucracy has been cited as potentially antithetical to the 
interests of the average private citizen.140 
While the corporation may no longer literally be a “creature of the 
state,” familiar problems such as regulatory capture demonstrate how 
the realities and incentives of the modern political world may result in 
state authorities acting to advance the interests of the corporations they 
regulate.141  Furthermore, the large corporation has evolved into a 
bureaucratic structure in its own right.142  Max Weber, one of the great 
theorists of bureaucracy, wrote that “[b]ureaucratic administration 
means fundamentally domination through knowledge,”143 crystallizing 
the insight that bureaucratic processes managed by a staff of “experts” 
serve to legitimize an underlying threat of force.  To the extent that the 
complex organizational structure and processes of the corporation allow 
it to make privileged claims to knowledge, especially when such claims 
appear to be supported by the authoritative structures of the state itself, 
 
 140. See KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 272 (1986) (noting that federal agencies are more often the targets of lobbying by 
corporations and trade associations, more so than by unions and citizen groups); GRAHAM K. WILSON, 
INTEREST GROUPS 59 (1990) (“The relationship between bureaucrats and interest groups in the United 
States is unusually suffused with politics.”). 
 141. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Can Regulatory Agencies Protect the Consumer?, in THE 
CITIZEN AND THE STATE 178, 181 (1975). 
 142. See SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900–1945, at 17–18 (1985); Gerald E. Frug, 
The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (discussing the 
relationship between a corporation and its shareholders); Timothy L. Fort: Religion in the Workplace: 
Mediating Religion’s Good, Bad and Ugly Naturally, 12 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 121, 
165 (1998) (“Size, however, explains how corporations, which utilize size to achieve competitive 
economies of scale, can easily lurch toward the kind of bureaucracy that undermines moral identity.”). 
 143. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 225 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978). 
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it occupies an inherently coercive role relative to the individual, which 
has the potential to enhance the psychological effects of its criminal 
misconduct on individuals and communities.  In the remainder of this 
Part, II discuss the relevant framework provided by the psychological 
literature for understanding how perceptions of injustice that arise from 
these interconnections can result in additional long-term trauma to 
victims.  I will then analyze how these perceptual harms take shape in 
the context of several specific examples of corporate crime. 
Scholars of “just world theory,” first presented by Melvin Lerner and 
Carolyn Simmons in a ground-breaking 1966 study, argue that most 
people have a basic investment in “deserving” life’s outcomes; in other 
words, they learn from childhood to obey a “personal contract” that 
consists of forgoing the gratification of immediate impulses in favor of 
goal-directed behavior geared toward better long-term outcomes.144  
Maintenance of this socially beneficial contract requires maintenance of 
the “belief in a just world.”  This belief is so important that, when 
exposed to instances of injustice that threaten it, people are motivated to 
attempt to preserve it through such defense mechanisms as blaming 
victims for their misfortune—by assuming, for example, that they had in 
some way “deserved it.” 
Carolyn Hafer has argued that a primary function of the belief in a 
just world is to provide for long-term investment according to existing 
societal rules for deservingness.145  Further research suggests that people 
also need to believe in a just world in order to maintain a sense of 
overall well-being in the face of negative events, and that these beliefs 
serve to minimize anger-induced stress.146  These beliefs serve as a 
resource to strengthen the well-being of senior citizens.147  Also, 
research suggests that the belief in a just world helps individuals find 
meaning in their lives, even if unjust events occur that cannot be 
reversed or compensated.148  Finally, a person’s belief in a just world is 
threatened not simply when an unfair negative outcome occurs, but 
when the perpetrator of the outcome escapes punishment.149  Any event 
 
 144. See Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer’s Reaction to the “Innocent Victim”: 
Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1966); Melvin J. Lerner, The 
Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to its Origins and Forms, 45 J. PERSONALITY 1 (1977); Melvin J. 
Lerner, Dale T. Miller, & John G. Holmes, Deserving and the Emergence of Forms of Justice, 9 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 133 (1976). 
 145. See Carolyn L. Hafer, Investment in Long-term Goals and Commitment to Just Means Drive 
the Need to Believe in a Just World, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1059, 1060 (2000). 
 146. See Claudia Dalbert, Beliefs in a Just World as a Buffer Against Anger, 15 SOC. JUST. RES. 
123, 123 (2002). 
 147. J. Dzuka & C. Dalbert, The Belief in a Just World and Subjective Well-Being in Old Age, 10 
AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 439, 442 (2006). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Carolyn L. Hafer, Do Innocent Victims Threaten the Belief in a Just World? Evidence From 
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that renders belief in a just world impossible by unavoidable 
demonstration of injustice therefore imposes additional trauma on the 
victim of an underlying injustice by simultaneously compromising his 
overall well-being through the threat to his belief in a just world.   
As a specific example of how these effects might play out in the 
context of a corporation committing a criminal act, consider the events 
following the Buffalo Creek mining disaster in 1972 in which a dam 
used for filtration by the Buffalo Mining Company broke, flooding a 
valley of small West Virginia mining towns with waste water and killing 
125 people.  Before it came to light that the dam violated multiple state 
and federal safety regulations, a New York based representative of the 
parent Pittston Corporation initially stated to The Charleston Gazette 
that “the break in the dam was caused by flooding—an Act of God.”150  
The victims’ reactions to this institutional response suggests the 
existence of additional harm attributable to the structural arrangement 
whereby a remote parent entity attempts to impose a controlling legal 
narrative on events, which—in addition to being factually inaccurate—
had the effect of psychic violence to the religious norms of a 
community: “I didn’t see God running any bulldozer,” said one Buffalo 
Creek resident, “It’s murder.  The big shots want to call it an act of God.  
It’s a lie.  They’ve told a lie on God, and they shouldn’t have done 
that.”151 
The residents’ perceptions of the party culpable for their suffering can 
be summarized in the words of Rev. Jim Somerville, the Secretary of the 
Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the Buffalo Creek Disaster: “We 
think that this coal company, Pittston, has murdered the people, and we 
call upon the prosecuting attorney and the judge . . . to prosecute and 
bring to trial this coal company.”152  Somerville went on to link harm to 
the institutional monolith formed by the corporate entity of the coal 
company and the background governmental actors: 
The fact of the matter is that these are all laws on the books which the 
company felt completely free to ignore, which says something about the 
relationship between coal companies and state governments . . . just this 
complete freedom to ignore these laws with no fear of any kind of 
prosecution.153 
These reactions point to a particular sort of harm done to the residents of 
 
a Modified Stroop Task, 79 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH 165, 171 (2000). 
 150. GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER 11 (1976). 
 151. Id. at 12. 
 152. Appalshop’s Buffalo Creek Film Preservation & Digital Outreach Project, The Buffalo Creek 
Flood: An Act of Man Transcript 5 (1975), available at http://appalshop.org/buffalo/media/BCF-
transcript.pdf. 
 153. Id. 
37
Sheley: Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
262 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
Buffalo Creek. In addition to the destruction of their homes and deaths 
of their loved ones, they suffered a certain violence to their psychic 
existences through the feeling of helplessness before the structure of the 
corporation itself, with its institutional connections to political power 
and the remote authority, even, to threaten the role of divine justice by 
falsely characterizing its misconduct as an act of God. 
As a second example, consider the nature of the long-term 
psychological harm documented in victims of the major oil spills of the 
last several decades, which evidence suggests to be exacerbated by the 
corporate nature of the responsible entities and issues related to 
assignation of blame.  The psychological literature has identified, in 
addition to the short-term effects of technological disaster on its victims, 
long-term social deterioration described as “the corrosive 
community.”154  Evidence attributes part of this corrosive effect to the 
members of a community struggling over where to place blame, 
authorities being evasive and unresponsive, and victims becoming 
suspicious and cynical.155  This suggests that the unavailability of a 
blaming mechanism in a corporate case of criminal negligence—which 
could be attributable to broad policies, as opposed to the discernable 
misconduct of particular individuals—would serve to exacerbate the 
actual harm felt by the victims of such disasters, in part due to a threat to 
their belief in a just world. 
Psychologist Deborah du Wann Winter, whose expertise centers on 
the psychological effects of environmental damage, has observed from 
her studies of victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill the primary 
emotional reaction to be “anger . . . around the oil companies’ failure to 
abide by regulations,” as well as “helplessness” (which she explains by 
noting the phenomenon of “learned helplessness,” which is the tendency 
of organisms to become non-responsive in the fact of situations over 
which they have no control).156  Again, the structural relationship 
between the corporation and the background legal authority can be 
directly linked to the psychological damage experienced by victims. 
In his Congressional testimony, Keith Jones, father of one of the BP 
employees killed during the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon, 
 
 154. See William R. Freudenburg, Contamination, Corrosion, and the Social Order: An 
Overview, 45 CURRENT SOC. 19 (1997); William R. Freudenburg & Timothy R. Jones, Attitudes and 
Stress in the Presence of Technological Risks: A Test of the Supreme Court Hypothesis, 69 SOC. FORCES 
1143 (1991); Krzysztof Kaniasty & Fran H. Norris, A Test of the Support Deterioration Model in the 
Context of Natural Disaster, 64 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 395 (1993); Kroll-Smith & Couch, 
Symbols, Ecology, and Contamination: Case Studies in the Ecological-Symbolic Approach to Disaster, 
5 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY 47–73 (1993). 
 155. See Freudenburg & Jones, supra note 154. 
 156. See Susan Koger, Coping with the Deepwater Horizon Disaster: An Ecopsychology 
Interview with Deborah Du Nann Winter, 2 ECOPSYCHOLOGY 205, 205 (2010). 
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explicitly couches his account of his own harm as related to the 
immutable corporate nature of the responsible entities: “TransOcean, 
Halliburton, and any other company will be back because they have the 
infrastructure and economic might to make more money.  But Gordon 
will never be back.  Never.  And neither will the ten good men who died 
with him.”157  This language—comparing, as it does, the singularity of 
his suffering with the static immortality of the corporate structure—
suggests the feelings of helplessness from which he suffers flow 
specifically from the nature of that structure. 
More research into the psychology of the victim impact of corporate 
crime would allow for a more robust understanding of the ways in which 
the nature of the corporate form produces criminal harm above and 
beyond that which flows from the direct actions of its employees.  I will 
now turn briefly to the question of enforcement and discuss how the 
current means by which corporate criminal liability is enforced—the 
product of the strict substantive law standard of pure vicarious liability 
and essentially limitless discretion upon the part of prosecutors to make 
decisions about charging—is at odds with the purposes of corporate 
criminal liability which this article has discussed. 
VI. PROBLEMS IN CURRENT ENFORCEMENT 
Enforcement of federal corporate criminal law is somewhat 
inconsistent due in part to the gap between the official substantive law 
principle of respondeat superior—in which corporations are per se liable 
for the misconduct of their employees regardless of corporate policies 
against the conduct—and the prosecutorial guidelines developed by the 
DOJ which determine which actions are brought in reality and the 
penalties sought.  In recent years one particularly notable variable has 
been the use of the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) and the non-
prosecution agreement (NPA) as tools for obtaining cooperation on 
behalf of corporate defendants in exchange for avoidance of indictment. 
A watershed moment in the history of federal corporate prosecution 
occurred on June 16, 1999, when then United States Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder issued a memorandum containing the government’s 
first official guidance for prosecutors in corporate matters (popularly 
referred to as the “Holder Memo”).158  The Holder Memo contained nine 
factors prosecutors could consider when deciding whether to prosecute a 
 
 157. Legal Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25 (2010) (statement of Keith D. Jones). 
 158. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen., to All Component Heads and 
United States Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF. 
39
Sheley: Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
264 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
corporation: (1) the “nature and seriousness of the offense,” (2) the 
“pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,” (3) the 
“corporation’s history of similar conduct,” (4) the “corporation’s timely 
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing,” (5) the corporation’s 
“willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if 
necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney–client and work product 
privileges,” (6) the “existence and adequacy of the corporation’s 
compliance program,” (7) the “corporation’s remedial actions,” (8) 
“collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to 
shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable,” and (9) the 
“adequacy of non-criminal remedies.”159 
Subsequent to the explosion of corporate scandals involving Enron, 
Adelphia, Worldcom, and Tyco—and the high-profile implication of 
accounting firm Arthur Andersen in the Enron matter—then-Deputy 
Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a revision to the Holder 
Memo on January 20, 2003.160  The Thompson Memo contained four 
primary additions to the basic directives of the Holder Memo.  First of 
all, it became binding upon federal prosecutors, rather than advisory.161  
It also stated that pre-trial diversion—such as through DPAs or NPAs—
could be an appropriate resolution to a corporate investigation,162 and 
added a tenth factor for prosecutors to consider in making indictment 
decisions concerning corporations: “the adequacy of the prosecution of 
individuals responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance[.]”163  Perhaps 
most importantly, it placed “increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the 
authenticity of a corporation’s cooperation,”164 because “[t]oo often 
business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a Department 
investigation, in fact take steps to impede the quick and effective 
exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under investigation.”165 
The Thompson Memo prompted a backlash from the white collar 
crime bar after a flood of increasingly severe DPAs and NPAs were 
executed,166 and in United States v. Stein the S.D.N.Y. held that the 
policy of the Memo had violated a KPMG employee’s Fifth Amendment 
right to counsel by interfering with an existing KPMG policy of 
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advancing attorney’s fees to employees during criminal 
investigations.167  In response, on December 12, 2006, then-Deputy 
Attorney General Paul McNulty released yet another revision of the 
guidelines, limiting the circumstances under which prosecutors may 
request a waiver of the attorney client or work product privileges and 
restricting prosecutors from considering a company’s payment of its 
employees’ attorneys’ fees as a sign of lack of cooperation.168 
The gap between substantive culpability standards and the extremely 
nuanced factors influencing prosecutorial decision making has created 
what some scholars have referred to as problems of incongruence.  
William Laufer and Alan Strudler put it succinctly: 
First, forward problems emerge where changes in the general part of the 
law—liability rules and culpability standards—are conceived without 
concern for how punishment is crafted or justified.  And reverse problems 
arise where standards for punishment impose liability or culpability that 
conflict with extant law in theory or practice.169 
Part of the problem, as Laufer and Strudler note, is that the federal 
charging guidelines abandon the basic notion of respondeat superior and 
turn, instead, on “features of the corporate person[,]” normally as 
defined by post-offense behavior which “may bear little correspondence 
to the underlying offense.”170  Other scholars have noted that the 
dramatic increase in corporate cooperation with criminal investigations 
has had the unintended effect of blurring the distinction between 
government and private entity, which has resulted in, among other 
things, the risk of corporations qualifying as agents of the state for the 
purposes of the Constitution, the risk of unwitting undermining of 
employee Fifth Amendment protections, the possibility of the 
government being deemed “in control” of corporate documents for the 
purposes of discovery requests by individual employees, and the placing 
of prosecutors “beyond [their] institutional competence” and into 
corporate oversight roles.171 
To return to the example of the FCPA, in cases involving a parent 
company with a subsidiary found to be involved in making illegal 
payments, the frequent strategy of prosecutors has been to bring actions 
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against the subsidiary under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA 
while entering into a side letter or DPA with the parent.  In such cases, if 
the parent is an issuer, the SEC may then bring a civil action against the 
parent for books and records and internal controls violations.172  
However, the DOJ has not consistently followed this practice; in at least 
one 2010 case, for example, the DOJ charged Pride International under 
the anti-bribery provisions for a scheme involving French and 
Venezuelan subsidiaries yet failed to allege Pride International’s 
involvement in the scheme.173 
Also notable has been the inconsistent approach to the prosecution of 
individuals.  Prior to 2007, very few individual defendants were charged 
under the FCPA; in 2007 and 2008 the DOJ and SEC brought actions 
against over thirty individuals between them.174  In 2008 Mark 
Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section at the DOJ, declared 
that the increased number of individuals prosecuted was “not an 
accident.  That is quite intentional on the part of the Department.  It is 
our view that to have a credible deterrent effect people have to go to 
jail.”175  The trend continued in 2009 and 2010.  In 2009 a sting 
operation directed at military and law enforcement equipment 
contractors yielded the largest single prosecution of individuals in the 
history of the enforcement of the FCPA (known as “the Shot Show 
cases”).176  There, an individual implicated in the BAE Systems 
investigation cooperated with the government and facilitated 
introductions to various industry acquaintances who all then agreed to 
pay a “20% [sales] commission” for a contract to outfit an African 
country’s presidential guard, knowing that half would be paid as a bribe 
to the Minister of Defense and half split between the sales agent and the 
intermediary.177  In 2010, the two agencies charged sixteen individuals 
between them (the DOJ specifically charged ten of these, four of them 
associated with one company, Lindsey Manufacturing).178  The 
explosion in FCPA enforcement in recent years has resulted in a niche 
market for law firms hoping to sell their expertise in predicting and 
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accommodating the often inconsistent enforcement patterns of the DOJ 
and the SEC. 
The disconnect between the substantive liability standard of 
respondeat superior and this inconsistent use of prosecutorial discretion 
is particularly problematic in light of the justifications for corporate 
criminal liability developed in this article.  Simply put, the purpose of 
punishment should be to track with the actual culpability of the entity 
being punished for the actual harm caused.  Even if background social 
norms support the punishment of a “corporate person,” it makes no 
sense to punish this “person” for crimes that cannot be attributed to the 
person as a whole.  If misconduct is perpetrated by a limited number of 
employees acting against overall corporate culture—particularly where 
the corporation has made good faith attempts to prevent such 
misconduct ahead of time—letting perceptions of personhood override 
this disconnect would improperly extend liability beyond desert.  The 
standard of criminal negligence I outlined in the first part of this paper 
would eliminate unjust punishment in these situations.  Yet it would also 
accommodate the long temporal periods that characterize most corporate 
misconduct by allowing a proximate mens rea of negligence on the part 
of the corporation as to a foreseeable future actus reus of an employee 
to form the basis for liability.  This is particularly appropriate given that, 
as I argue, it is the enduring structure of a corporation that imposes a 
particular kind of harm on the victim of its crimes. 
Furthermore, the current prosecutorial emphasis on post-indictment 
behavior such as cooperation undermines the expressive benefits of 
corporate criminal liability by divorcing punishment from the harm 
actual imposed by the misconduct.  And, as this article has also shown, 
part of the harm caused by corporate misconduct is the creation of the 
perception of corporations as structurally aligned with sources of legal 
power.  If this is the case, then the blurring of the line between 
prosecutor and management occasioned by the current regime’s focus 
on ex post cooperation risks solidifying this problem. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In determining whether an employee of the state-owned utility 
Lindsey Manufacturing bribed qualified as a “foreign official” under the 
FCPA, the court considered the fact that the Mexican constitution gives 
its citizens a right to electricity.179  As Mexico is a country where, 
according to a 2007 study, bribes consumed 8% of family incomes in 
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2007 and moved 10% of all transactions with the government,180 and 
where 44% of businesses reported that they continued to pay bribes to 
government officials,181 it is clear that Lindsey’s misconduct interfered 
with a politically defined substantive right, and imposed the further 
harm of solidifying an institutional relationship between corrupt 
government officials and the business entities that support its corruption 
at the expense of individual citizens. 
The Lindsey conviction also serves as a positive exception to the 
recent trend of corporate criminal liability being resolved through DPAs 
and NPAs.  Rather than the question of culpability resting on 
prosecutorial charging decisions, it was thrown into the forum of the 
criminal courtroom, one of the few institutions in our system of 
government in which citizen representatives, rather than bureaucratic 
specialists, wield state authority.  To be sure that the preponderance of 
criminal actions are resolved through settlement, as opposed to trial, is 
hardly unique to corporations; most individual federal defendants enter 
guilty pleas and waive a number of rights in so doing.182  The outcome 
of a jury trial has unique benefits in the corporate context under the 
current liability standard, however.  This is not only because the 
utilitarian benefits of punishing corporations arise from the system’s 
ability to capture background communal norms about corporate desert, 
but also because the very nature of the harm caused by a corporate 
action such as bribery is the reinforcing of the corporation’s structural 
interconnectedness with other institutions of formal power.  To further 
exacerbate this interconnectedness is counterproductive to the 
vindication of that particular harm. 
It is certainly the case that criminal liability would make much more 
sense if the substantive law changed from the current standard of 
vicarious liability to require a showing of pervasive criminal intent 
throughout the corporate entity, in order to better justify finding the 
“corporate person” collectively liable for criminal misconduct.  Yet 
where such pervasive intent exists, it is important to recognize the 
entity’s liability for the distinctively collective harm it imposes. 
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